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Summary 
A flight simulator experiment was set up to study relevant Human Factors tools for Situation 
Awareness assessment of pilots. A specific scenario was designed in which a malfunction of the 
aircraft was introduced during flight: an Indicated Air Speed discrepancy. Pilot behaviour was 
studied while pilots tried to figure out the correct speed. Eye movement metrics alone provided 
an insufficient picture of pilot Situation Awareness, but when purposefully combined with 
subjective, self-rating metrics, they offered a more comprehensive look at Situation Awareness, 
covering all three levels of Endsley’s Situation Awareness definition. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past two or three decades, the concept of Situation Awareness (SA) has received 
considerable attention from the Human Factors (HF) research community. Although, originally 
a term used within (military) aviation, SA has developed into a major concern in many other 
domains where people operate complex, dynamic systems (e.g. maintenance, air traffic control, 
medical systems, and nuclear power industry). Achieving SA is one of the most challenging 
aspects of these operators’ jobs and is central to good decision making and performance. This 
stems largely from a growing concern with the effects of widespread automation and advanced 
information systems on the ability of humans to take in and comprehend exactly what is going 
on without becoming confused, overloaded or error-prone. As a consequence, valid and 
meaningful measures of SA are required to help us assess the design and use of complex 
systems in simulations and operational settings. The current article describes a flight simulator 
experiment that was set up to study relevant HF tools for SA assessment of pilots. 
 
1.1 Situation awareness assessment 
SA defined.  Many theories of SA have been developed. The most commonly used 
and widely cited theory of SA is the three-level model of SA proposed by Endsley (1995a). 
Endsley defines SA as “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future” (Endsley, 1995a, p. 36). Inherent in this definition is the operator’s notion of what is 
important. SA is frequently defined in operational terms. For a given operator, therefore, SA is 
defined in terms of the goals and decision tasks for that job. The pilot does not need to know 
everything (e.g. the co-pilot’s shoe size), but does need to know a great deal of information 
related to the goal of safely flying the aircraft. The “elements” of SA vary widely between 
domains, however, the nature of SA and the mechanisms used for achieving SA can be 
described generically. 
The three-level model of SA divides SA into three hierarchical activity levels (for more 
detailed information on the three-level model of SA, see Endsley, 1995a; Stanton et al., 2006; 
Vidulich, 2003). For instance, in an aircraft environment, pilots must be aware of critical flight 
parameters, the state of their on-board systems, their own location and the location of important 
reference points and terrain, and the location of other aircraft. This information forms the 
elements they need to perceive for good Level 1 SA (i.e. “perception of the elements in the 
environment”). But a great deal has to do with how the operators interpret the information they 
take in. Pilots need to comprehend that the displayed altitude is below their assigned altitude. 
This understanding forms their Level 2 SA (i.e. “comprehension of the elements and their 
meaning”). At the highest level, Level 3 SA (i.e. “projection of future status”), their 
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understanding of the state of the system and its dynamics can allow them to be able to predict 
the near future. Pilots may predict that in case of a diversion, due to bad weather, they may 
experience fuel shortage and, therefore, need to look out for an alternate airport. 
 
SA measured.  The assessment of SA is often used throughout the design lifecycle, 
either to evaluate the effect of (novel) technologies and training interventions upon SA, to 
assess SA in existing operational systems, or to examine factors that affect SA. Measurement is 
needed for systematic improvement of human performance, either by training or by systems 
design. Several HF tools have been established for the measurement of SA (for a complete 
overview of SA measures, see Gawron, 2008; Stanton et al., 2006). Taylor et al. (1995) 
suggested approaches that include performance-based metrics, physiological indices, memory 
probe measures of SA knowledge and subjective, self-report ratings. In a review of SA 
measurement techniques, Endsley (1995b) described the same approaches more or less, 
including physiological measurement techniques, performance measures, external and imbedded 
task measures, subjective rating techniques (self- and observer-ratings), questionnaires (post-
trial and on-line) and the so-called freeze technique. 
The construct of SA is complex and comprises many aspects. As such SA should not be 
assessed using a single tool. Here, the strategy entails the use of different HF tools and see if the 
different results converge into the same direction (also referred to as the converging evidence 
principle). For instance, ask pilots to rate their own SA and compare these ratings with the 
ratings from a subject matter expert who monitored the flight on video. These tools together 
should provide a coherent impression of the SA in this particular setting. 
Furthermore, the choice for a certain SA measurement technique should be dependent on the 
level of SA (according to Endsley, 1995a) that is being assessed. For instance, Endsley’s 
definition of SA claims that pilots first have to notice a particular phenomenon in order to 
become aware, understand and project into the future. This first step (i.e. “perception of 
elements in the environment”) can be measured by eye tracking. The eye tracker illustrates 
where the pilots focus their attention on. As such the eye tracker could be a helpful tool to 
measure Level 1 SA. 
 
1.2 Flight simulator experiment 
The primary goal of the current flight simulator experiment was to study relevant HF tools for 
SA assessment of pilots and to determine if these tools together provide a coherent impression 
of the pilots’ SA. A specific scenario was designed in which a malfunction of the aircraft was 
simulated: an Indicated Air Speed (IAS) discrepancy. The malfunction was introduced 
unbeknownst to the pilots during flight and slowly progressed over time while researchers 
monitored if and how pilots detected the IAS discrepancy and figured out the correct air speed. 
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Pilot behaviour was studied during the scenario using eye tracking and two different subjective, 
self-report rating techniques (on-line and post-trial ratings). It was expected that the different 
HF tools together would provide a more coherent impression of the pilots’ SA than the 
individual measures separately. 
 
Eye tracking.  In many studies, the direction of an operator’s viewing direction has 
been monitored to determine what instruments, displays or information sources were used. The 
assumption should be made here that the operator attends to the information his eyes are 
directed toward; i.e. eye movements are an indicator of visual attention (for a review, see 
Rayner, 1998). Researchers at NASA-Langley Research Center have conducted numerous 
studies in which eye tracking was used in a general aviation simulator (summarized in Harris et 
al., 1986). They proposed two measurement techniques for display evaluation: (1) comparing 
histogram plots of dwell times for different instruments and (2) measuring scan pattern changes 
as the difficulty of a task increases. The two analytic techniques provided converging evidence 
that one instrument was superior to the other. 
Part of the current research focused on the question if eye tracking is a useful HF tool to 
understand how SA is maintained / obtained. In the current research, where pilots are trying to 
detect a simulated malfunction, the dwell times for different instruments might reveal where the 
pilot’s primary focus of attention is. This typically reflects a Level 1 SA: perception of the IAS 
discrepancy. It was expected that pilots would spend more time looking at instruments where 
information about the malfunction may be found, at the cost of looking at other instruments 
where they would have looked when there was no malfunction. 
Additionally, the randomness of the pilots’ scanning pattern might reveal the search strategies 
of the pilots, trying to detect and interpret the malfunction. This probably tells us more about the 
Level 2 SA: comprehension of the IAS discrepancy. It was expected that the scanning pattern 
would be more random after the pilots discovered the malfunction because they were searching 
for the solution. 
 
Subjective ratings. The simple rating technique called Instantaneous Self Assessment 
(ISA) rating scale (Castle & Legatt, 2002) was used in the current research. The ISA rating scale 
was originally developed to evaluate mental workload of air traffic controllers and pilots. 
However, instead of evaluating workload, the current research used the ISA technique to 
measure the pilots’ overview of the situation on that particular moment in the scenario. This 
comprised several on-line ratings of the pilots. The ISA ratings do not specifically measure a 
certain level of SA; it generally focuses on the idea of “what is going on”. The research question 
concerning the ISA rating scale was if ISA ratings provide generic insight in the course of the 
pilots’ SA during the scenario. Knowing if and when SA degenerates and/or improves can be of 
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great value to the interpretation of other measures. ISA ratings were expected to degenerate 
when pilots became aware of the simulated malfunction. 
The Crew Awareness Rating Scale (CARS; McGuinness & Foy, 2000) is a SA 
assessment technique (this comprised a post-trial rating scale) that is based upon the three-level 
model of SA (Endsley, 1995a). The scale is designed to elicit ratings based upon ease of 
identification, understanding and projection of task SA elements (i.e. Levels 1, 2 and 3 SA). 
Stanton et al. (2006) claim that CARS could be used in conjunction with on-line techniques –
such as the ISA rating scale– to ensure comprehensiveness. Using CARS only an overall SA 
rating is acquired at the end of the task, rather than several ratings during the course of the task. 
This could potentially inhibit the usefulness of the output, not knowing the course of the pilots’ 
SA during the scenario, and not being able to pinpoint specific problems. The research question 
concerning CARS was if this is a useful SA assessment technique, in conjunction with an on-
line subjective rating scale, being the ISA rating scale. The overall CARS rating was expected 
to be relatively low due to the hampered SA in the scenario. 
 
 
2 Methods 
The current experiment was part of a larger study on the applicability of Human Factors tools in 
the design, evaluation and operation of aviation systems (for an overview of this study, see Zon 
& Van Dijk, 2009). 
 
2.1 Participating pilots 
Six crews of each two airline pilots (i.e. a captain and a first officer) participated in the current 
experiment: one Italian, two Spanish and three Dutch crews. The average age of the 
participating pilots was 38 years (standard deviation SD 6.0 years). All pilots were active and 
qualified to fly an Airbus A320. On average they had 7450 hours of flight experience (SD 4850 
hours). 
There were two pilot roles in the simulation: pilot flying (PF), carried out by the first 
officer, and pilot not flying (PNF), carried out by the captain. The pilot tasks match normal 
operations. 
 
2.2 Flight simulator 
GRACE (Generic Research Aircraft Cockpit Environment) is a generic flight simulator, 
representing a modern large two-engine fly-by-wire airliner (Heesbeen et al., 2006). GRACE 
has a number of standard configurations. For the current experiment the Airbus A320 
configuration was selected. A high fidelity simulator such as GRACE allows researchers to 
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perform realistic experiments in a fully controlled environment. Before the experiment started, 
extensive practice runs were conducted by the pilots to familiarise with the GRACE simulator. 
 
2.3 Flight scenario 
All crews performed one run of the same simulated flight. The simulated flight consisted of a 
trip from London Heathrow to Amsterdam Schiphol (starting in cruise, ending after 
touchdown). A specific scenario was designed simulating a certain malfunction of the aircraft 
during the flight: an IAS discrepancy was introduced. The discrepancy was indicated by the two 
available Primary Flight Displays (PFDs); i.e. one display showed the correct air speed while 
the other showed a lower, false air speed (see Figure 1 for a PFD with the speed tape circled in 
red). Once the discrepancy was initiated by the simulator after about 10 minutes in flight, it 
slowly progressed over time while researchers monitored if and how the pilots detected the 
discrepancy, and if and how the pilots figured out what the correct air speed was. As far as the 
crew was concerned, they were flying a normal flight until the malfunction was detected. The 
flight duration of this scenario was 25 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 1. PFD with the speed tape circled on the left vertical bar 
 
In addition to the current flight scenario, where the IAS discrepancy was introduced, a reference 
scenario was flown by all crews. This reference scenario was similar to the first part of the IAS 
discrepancy scenario; i.e. before the malfunction was initiated. The duration of this reference 
scenario was 10 minutes. The sequence in which both scenarios were flown was randomized. 
 
2.4 SA measurement techniques 
Pilot behaviour was studied using the following HF tools: 
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Eye tracker.  Eye tracking data were collected using the Applied Science 
Laboratories 6000 eye tracker, together with an Ascension Technologies optical head tracker. 
Both pilots wore a headband on which the optronics were mounted. During flight, all eye 
activity was recorded. To facilitate data analysis of the current flight scenario, five relevant 
Areas-of-Interest (AoIs) were defined for the PF and PNF: Primary Flight Display (PFD), cross 
check (i.e. other PFD), Navigation Display (ND), Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring 
(ECAM) system, and “other” (e.g. outside). 
Dwell time and entropy were used as eye tracking measures for the PF and PNF. Dwell 
time provides information regarding the amount of time spent viewing the different AoIs. 
Entropy is a measure of randomness of the viewing pattern (for the used calculation method, see 
Ellis & Stark, 1986). 
 
ISA.   The five-point ISA rating scale was used in the current research to 
measure the pilots’ overview of the situation on that particular moment in the scenario; i.e. the 
ratings were self assessed during the flight (on-line ratings). The PF and PNF were asked (every 
2 minutes) to respond to the rating scale presented on the touch screen display by assessing 
his/her (individual) current situation overview (5 being very high and 1 being very low). 
 
CARS.   The CARS was administered post-trial to assess SA. The CARS 
identifies four common components of SA: (1) perception: detecting and recognising current 
facts and data; (2) comprehension: making appropriate interpretations of the facts and data; (3) 
projection: making realistic predictions of future developments; and (4) appreciation: 
appreciating implications for goals, decisions and actions. For each aspect of SA there are two 
rating scales, one addressing the perceived accuracy of the awareness and the other addressing 
the perceived difficulty of the processing involved, which is an aspect of workload. To enable 
this assessment, the questions used with the scale were framed so as to prompt the pilots to 
consider whether or not they think they have “good” SA or are finding it “easy to maintain” SA. 
Each question came with a rating scale, plus a “not applicable” response option. 
 
2.5 Data analysis 
It was expected –as the IAS discrepancy progressed over time– that most of the crews detected 
the malfunction earlier than after the 2 minutes on which the aircraft would automatically send 
out a warning. As it turned out, none of the six crews discovered the specific discrepancy on 
both PFDs before an auditory warning was heard and the ECAM system indicated the air speed 
discrepancy. Consequently, the analysis focussed only on the time that the crew needed to 
figure out the correct air speed, and not on the time they needed to detect the IAS discrepancy 
(i.e. the ECAM system already indicated the discrepancy). The period after the warning until the 
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moment of determination of the correct air speed (as observed by the experiment leader) is 
referred to as post-period. In the analysis of the eye tracking measures (dwell time and entropy) 
and ISA ratings, this post-period is compared to a pre-period that has the same length as the 
post-period and takes place immediately before the onset of the IAS discrepancy (see Figure 2 
for an illustration of this time-line). 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the time-line for the analysis 
 
Concerning the analysis of the CARS ratings, comparisons are made between post-trial ratings 
for the reference scenario and the IAS discrepancy scenario. 
 
 
3 Results 
 
An α of 5% was used for significance testing and Cohen’s d was used as a measure of effect 
size. 
 
Dwell times.  The dwell times (in percentage) on the different AoIs (with exception 
of the AoI “other”) in the pre- and post-period are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Post-period Pre- 
Warning 
Time 
2 min 
Introduction 
malfunction 
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Figure 3. Percentage dwell time on pilot’s own and other PFD, ND, and ECAM in the pre- and 
post-period 
 
The differences in dwell times on the AoIs between the pre- and post-period were analysed. A 
repeated measures analysis showed significantly interaction effect for Period * AoI (F(3,8) = 
7,404, p < .05, η2p = .735). A subsequent paired-samples t-test showed an increased amount of 
time spent dwelling on the pilot’s own PFD in the post-period compared to the pre-period (t(9) 
= -2.326, p < .05, d = -.74). Similar results were found for cross check behaviour (t(9) = -4.005, 
p < .01, d = -1.27). ND dwell times decreased (t(9) = 3.191, p < .05, d = 1.01). The analysis for 
the ECAM dwell times did not indicate a difference between the pre- and post-period. 
The relationship between the time it took for the pilots to figure out the correct air speed 
and the amount of time spent looking at the different PFDs (own and other) was also analysed. 
The malfunction could only be discovered by cross checking both PFDs and comparing the 
information presented on them. A significant negative correlation was found between the 
discovery period and the amount of time spent cross checking the other PFD (r(12) = -.613, p < 
.05). This implicates that the more time the pilot spent on cross checking the other PFD, the less 
  
NLR-TP-2009-627 
  
 12 
time it took to figure out the correct air speed. There was no significant correlation found for the 
time spent on one’s own PFD. 
 
Entropy.  The randomness of the pilots’ scanning pattern was investigated using a 
paired-samples t-test. The results showed a significant increase in entropy during the post-
period compared to the pre-period (t(10) = -2.347, p < .05, d = -.71). That is, the pattern 
followed by the eye movements during the post-period was less systematic than during the pre-
period indicated searching behaviour. The statistics for the entropy (normalized) in the pre- and 
post-period are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Statistics (mean M, standard deviation SD, and standard error of mean SEM) for 
entropy in the pre- and post-period 
 M SD SEM 
Pre-period 0,56 0,14 0,04 Entropy 
Post-period 0,67 0,08 0,02 
 
ISA ratings.  The average of multiple ISA answers per crew were investigated using 
a paired-samples t-test (n = 28). ISA ratings were significantly lower in the post-period than in 
the pre-period (t(27) = 2.780, p < .05. d = .52). The statistics for the ISA-ratings in the pre- and 
post-period are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Statistics (mean M, standard deviation SD, and standard error of mean SEM) for ISA-
ratings in the pre- and post-period 
 M SD SEM 
Pre-period 4,50 0,51 0,10 ISA ratings 
Post-period 4,18 0,67 0,13 
 
CARS ratings.  The CARS ratings were investigated using a paired-samples t-test (n = 
13). CARS ratings were significantly lower after the IAS discrepancy scenario than after the 
reference scenario (t(12) = 2.670, p < .05. d = .74). The statistics for the CARS ratings in the 
reference and IAS discrepancy scenario are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Statistics (mean M, standard deviation SD, and standard error of mean SEM) for CARS 
ratings in the reference and IAS discrepancy scenario 
 M SD SEM 
Reference scenario 0,45 0,16 0,05 CARS ratings 
IAS discrepancy scenario 0,36 0,11 0,03 
 
 
4 Discussion 
The current flight simulator experiment examined relevant HF tools for SA assessment of pilots. 
Pilot behaviour was studied using eye tracking and subjective, self-report rating techniques. As 
it turned out, these HF tools together provided a coherent impression of the pilots’ compromised 
SA, covering all three levels of Endsley’s SA definition. 
 
Eye tracking.  Salmon et al. (2006) referred to the measurement of eye movements as 
“recording the process that operators use in order to develop SA”. An eye tracking device can 
be used to measure the viewing direction, which can then be used to measure how the operator’s 
attention is allocated during the task under analysis (Zelinksy, 2008). The basic assumption here 
is that looking at a certain location means that attention is focussed on this particular location 
(and information is being perceived). With this notion the current study results indicated eye 
tracking to be a helpful tool in measuring the crucial first step in the process of establishing SA: 
the perception of the instruments where information about the malfunction could be found (as 
indicated by the increased dwell times for own and other PFD, and ECAM). This was at the cost 
of looking at instruments where no relevant information about the malfunction could be found 
(as indicated by the decreased dwell times for ND). 
Furthermore, eye tracking results revealed that the more time the pilots spent on cross 
checking the PFD, the less time it took to figure out the correct air speed. This corresponds with 
the notion that cross checking the PFD is evident in monitoring the air speed discrepancy 
between the two PFDs. However, the pilots can not figure out the correct air speed just by cross 
checking the PFD. There are other methods they need to apply (e.g. checking with the air traffic 
controller, using ECAM to identify malfunctioning equipment, and calculating the indicated air 
speed based on the ground speed on the ND). The point is that all of these methods involved 
cross checking the PFD, as the indicated air speed is depicted here. This was clearly indicated 
by the eye tracking results. 
The randomness of the pilots’ scanning pattern (also referred to as entropy) indicated a 
more random search after the pilots discovered the malfunction. This was as hypothesised as 
they then started searching for the solution; i.e. decreasing their SA. Looking at Endsley’s SA 
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definition, this measure does not merely focus on the perception of the malfunction (i.e. Level 
1); it also tells us something about understanding the IAS discrepancy (i.e. Level 2) as the pilots 
understood they needed to start looking for correct air speed. 
 
Subjective ratings. Subjective, self-rating assessments of SA are popular because these 
techniques are fairly inexpensive, easy to administer, and non-intrusive (Pritchett & Hansman, 
2000). One of the main criticisms of self-rating techniques is that operators cannot be aware of 
their own lack of SA. For example, in a study comparing several cockpit displays designed to 
facilitate spatial orientation, Fracker and Vidulich (1991) found that the display that produced 
the best subjective ratings of SA also resulted in the greatest percentage of inverted recoveries; 
i.e. pilots believed they were upright when actually they were inverted. 
Another point of criticism refers to the fact that SA may be highly influenced by self-
assessments of performance and thus become biased by issues that are beyond the SA construct. 
Venturino et al. (1989) found a high correlation between post-trial subjective measures of SA 
and performance. That is, operators rated their SA as good if the trial had a positive outcome 
regardless of whether good SA, luck, or other factors influenced performance. Thus, once a 
situation has unfolded, a person’s memory of what their SA was earlier in the session can be 
influenced by the outcome, thereby limiting the usefulness of post-trial subjective measures. 
Instead of indicating the operator’s true SA, these measures may actually indicate the operator’s 
confidence level regarding his or her SA (Endsley, 1995b). 
Trying to counteract the aforementioned bias, the current research implemented the ISA 
technique in such a manner that ratings could be assessed during the course of the flight instead 
of after the flight; i.e. pilots could rate their SA on a particular given moment in the scenario. 
This helps to pinpoint the ups and downs in the SA of the specific pilot. As it turns out, 
assessing ISA in flight (using a touch screen display) is an easy-to-implement and easy-to-use 
technique in an experiment. The pilots did not report any problems (e.g. distraction of the flying 
task or intrusiveness of the tool) and rated their situation overview immediately after the scale 
popped up on the touch screen. As expected, the reported ratings degenerated directly after the 
ECAM warning. 
Multidimensional rating scales, such as the CARS, break down SA into its components 
(i.e. Levels 1, 2 and 3 SA) that are available for post-trial self-rating. For the current IAS 
discrepancy scenario this resulted in a relatively low overall SA rating. The current research 
wondered if CARS is a useful technique in conjunction with the on-line ISA rating scale. That 
is, ISA being able to pinpoint specific SA problems and CARS as an overall, validated measure 
for SA, together providing a full scope of SA and tackling some of the limitations of subjective, 
self-rating assessments. Although it seems that both measures supply similar results –being a 
diminished SA– the ISA results indeed gives us more insight about the course of the pilot’s 
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situation overview. This could even be improved by continuing the simulated flight after the 
solution for the malfunction was found, instead of interrupting the scenario. Not only knowing 
if and when SA degenerates, but also knowing if and when it improves, can be of great 
additional value to the interpretation of measures such as CARS. 
 
Recommendations. The majority of SA measurement approaches focus on the 
measurement of SA from an individual operator perspective, and there has been only limited 
attention given to the assessment of team, or distributed SA (Salmon et al., 2008). Theoretically, 
SA remains predominantly an individual construct. SA in complex, collaborative environments 
thus remains a challenge for the human factors community, both in terms of the development of 
theoretical perspectives and of valid measures (Salas et al., 1995). Regarding the current 
research, it might be interesting to study the different roles of the PF and PNF in re-establishing 
team SA after the malfunction was introduced. Expert rating scales could be an interesting 
approach in assessing team SA. 
 
Conclusions.  The relevance of the HF tools eye tracking and subjective, self-report 
rating techniques must be recognized, despite the fact they all are subject to possible limitations. 
The different measures provided complementary information. Individual eye movement metrics 
alone provide an insufficient picture of the operator’s SA (primarily Level 1 SA), but when 
purposefully combined with subjective, self-rating metrics, they offer a more comprehensive 
look at the operator’s SA, covering all three levels of Endsley’s SA definition. 
When measuring SA, there should be an attempt to adhere to the following guidelines: 
(a) when possible, several measures of SA should be utilized to allow different results to 
converge into the same direction and together provide a coherent impression of the operator’s 
SA; (b) the choice for a certain SA measurement technique should depend on the level of SA 
(according to Endsley, 1995a) that is being assessed. 
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